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A game-theoretic framework for time-inconsistent stopping problems
where the time-inconsistency is due to the consideration of a non-linear
function of an expected reward is developed. A class of mixed strategy stop-
ping times that allows the agents in the game to jointly choose the intensity
function of a Cox process is introduced and motivated. A subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium is defined. The equilibrium is characterized and other nec-
essary and sufficient equilibrium conditions including a smooth fit result are
proved. Existence and uniqueness are investigated. A mean-variance and a
variance problem are studied. The state process is a general one-dimensional
Itô diffusion.
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1 Introduction
Consider a diffusionX and the classical problem of choosing a stopping time τ that max-
imizes
Ex(h(Xτ )),
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where h is a nice deterministic function. Recall that the solution to this problem is consis-
tent in the sense that the optimal rule for stopping, i.e. ’stop the first time that X enters
the stopping region’, is independent of the initial state x. In this paper, we generalize this
setting by considering non-linear nice deterministic functions f and g and the problem
of choosing a stopping time τ that maximizes
Ex(f(Xτ )) + g(Ex(h(Xτ ))).
The optimal stopping rule for this problemwill, in contrast, typically depend on the initial
state x, whichmeans that it will not generally satisfy Bellman’s principle of optimality. In
the literature this is known as time-inconsistency. Generalizations of classical stochastic
control problems leading to time-inconsistency are discussed in Section 1.2 below.
Time-inconsistent problems are typically studied using one of the following approaches:
• The game-theoretic approach studied in the present paper, whichmeans formulating
the problem as a game and look for equilibrium stopping times, see Definition 2.2
and Section 2.1 below.
• The pre-commitment approach, which means formulating the problem for a fixed
initial state and allowing the corresponding optimal stopping rule to depend on
that initial state.
• The dynamic optimality approach, developed in [34]. See also [9] for a short de-
scription.
In [9] we developed a game-theoretic framework for time-inconsistent stopping problems
covering endogenous habit formation and non-exponential discounting. In the present
paper, a game-theoretic framework for time-inconsistent stopping problems that can han-
dle e.g. mean-variance problems is developed. See Section 1.2 for an explanation of these
terms. In the present paper we also define mixed strategy stopping times by allowing the
agents in the game to jointly choose the intensity function of a Cox process that is used as
a randomization device for the stopping decision, see Definition 2.2 and the motivation in
Section 2.1. This type of mixed strategy stopping time appears to be novel, although other
types of mixed strategies in stopping games have been considered and the Cox process
has been used in other ways in different kinds of stopping games, see Section 1.1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we formulate the time-
inconsistent stopping problem in detail and give the definitions of mixed strategy stop-
ping time and equilibrium. These definitions are motivated and discussed in Section 2.1.
In Section 3 the equilibrium is characterized and other results with necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for equilibrium are proven, these are the main results of the present
paper, see Theorem 3.2, Theorem 3.5, Theorem 3.6 and Theorem 3.7. In Section 4 the
developed theory is applied. Section 4.1 studies a variance problem and underlies the ne-
cessity of using mixed strategy equilibria. Section 4.2 studies a mean-variance problem.
In particular, Theorem 4.6 shows that the mean-variance problem has no equilibrium
for some parameter specifications, implying that we cannot generally expect equilibria
to exist. Section 4.3 studies an example with two different equilibria, implying that we
cannot in general expect equilibrium uniqueness.
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1.1 Previous literature
The game-theoretic approach to time-inconsistent problemswas first considered by Strotz
[39] in a seminal paper studying dynamic utility maximization under non-exponential
discounting. The approach was further developed by Selten [37, 38] who introduced the
notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which is a refinement of the Nash equilib-
rium suitable for dynamic games.
Recently, there has been a substantial effort to develop the literature on the game-
theoretic approach to time-inconsistent control problems. The main theoretical result
of time-inconsistent Markovian stochastic control is a characterization of an equilib-
rium as a solution to a generalized HJB equation called the extended HJB system, see
[4, 5, 29]. Recently a considerable literature using the extended HJB system to study
time-inconsistent control problems has emerged, examples include [2, 6, 17, 26, 28].
The development of the literature on the game-theoretic approach to time-inconsistent
stopping problems is in an earlier stage. Recent papers include [1, 9, 11, 20, 21, 22, 24].
Section 1.2 describes references studying particular time-inconsistent stopping problems,
while Section 2.1 contains a further review focusing on the choice of definition for pure
andmixed strategies and equilibria. Section 4 contains further references to papers study-
ing mean-variance and variance problems. For short surveys of time-inconsistent stop-
ping problems we also refer to [1, 9, 34].
Recent papers on time-inconsistent stopping problems and the dynamic optimality and
pre-commitment approaches include [31, 34].
In [32], a mean-field optimal stopping game for e.g. bank-runs is studied. The default
time is modeled as the first jump time of a given Cox process. In [10, 16], optimal stopping
problems where stopping can only occur at exogenously determined Poisson jump times
are studied.
1.2 Reasons for time-inconsistency
In this section we formulate simple examples to give an idea about the type of time-
inconsistent problems that are studied in finance and economics. In particular, we see that
problems of mean-variance type can be studied in the framework of the present paper,
whereas problems of endogenous habit formation and non-exponential discounting type
can be studied in the general framework of [9].
Mean-variance optimization/utility: Suppose the processX corresponds to the price
of an asset that an investor wants to sell. A plan for the asset sale is formalized as a
stopping time. The utility of the investor, given the current price x and an asset sale plan
τ , is,
Ex(Xτ )− γVarx(Xτ ), with γ > 0.
The economic interpretation is that the there is a tradeoff between the expected selling
price and risk measured by variance. The parameter γ corresponds to risk aversion. The
game-theoretic approach to stopping problems of this type is studied in Section 4.2 and
[1].
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Endogenous habit formation: Consider the asset selling problem but suppose the in-
vestor for a given current price x considers,
Ex(F (Xτ , x)), (1.1)
where F (·, x) is a standard utility function for each fixed x. The economic interpretation
is that the investor dynamically updates a habitual preference for the expected utility of
the selling price that is based on the current asset price. The game-theoretic approach to
stopping problems of this type is studied in [9].
Non-exponential discounting: Consider the asset selling problem but suppose the in-
vestor at time t given the current price x considers,
Et,x(δ(τ − t)F (Xτ )),
where F is a standard utility function and δ is a discounting function — that is, δ :
[0,∞) → [0, 1] is non-increasing with δ(0) = 1 — which cannot be written as an ex-
ponential discounting function. The game-theoretic approach to stopping problems of
this type is studied in [20, 21, 22, 24]. Problems of this type can be studied in the general
framework of [9] by considering the time-space process.
2 Problem formulation
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,Px) be a filtered probability space carrying a one-dimensionalWiener
processW . LetX be a one-dimensional diffusion living on an open interval E = (α, β),
where −∞ ≤ α ≤ β ≤ ∞, which is the unique strong solution to the SDE
dXt = µ(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dWt, X0 = x.
The coefficients µ : E → R and σ : E → (0,∞) are continuous and satisfy conditions
guaranteeing the existence of a unique strong solution, see e.g. [25]. Moreover, for each
continuous function λ : E → [0,∞) the filtered probability space is assumed to carry
anX-associated Cox process denoted byNλ, meaning thatNλ is a Poisson process with
intensity corresponding to λ(Xt) conditional on the natural filtration generated byX , see
e.g. [3, Sec. 6.6]. It is assumed that the filtration (Ft)t≥0 satisfies the usual conditions and
that x 7→ Px(F ) is measurable for each F ∈ F . The associated expectations are denoted
by Ex. It is assumed that a measurable time shift operator θ withXτ ◦ θτh = Xτ◦θτh+τh
exists, where τ is a, possibly infinite, stopping time (with respect to (Ft)t≥0) and
τh := inf{t ≥ 0 : |Xt −X0| ≥ h}.
Now consider the functions f, h : E → R and g : R → R satisfying Assumption 2.4
(below) and the problem of finding a stopping time τ that maximizes
Jτ (x) := Ex(f(Xτ )) + g(Ex(h(Xτ ))). (2.1)
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Remark 2.1. We use the convention that h(Xτ ) := lim supt→∞ h(Xt) on {τ = ∞}
and similarly for f . We assume that the limits g(∞) := limx→∞ g(x) and g(−∞) :=
limx→−∞ g(x) exist, see Assumption 2.4.
Let us specify which type of stopping times are admissible (Definition 2.2) and then give
the equilibrium definition (Definition 2.3). For a fixed stopping time τ we define the
functions φτ and ψτ by,
φτ (x) = Ex(f(Xτ )) and ψτ (x) = Ex(h(Xτ )).
Definition 2.2. Consider a continuous function λ : E → [0,∞) and the corresponding
Cox process Nλ. Let τλ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Nλt 6= N
λ
t−}. Let C ⊂ E be an open set and
let τC := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt /∈ C}. Then τ
λ,C := τλ ∧ τC is said to be a mixed (Markov)
strategy stopping time. A mixed strategy stopping time τλ,C is said to be admissible if the
function Jτλ,C in (2.1) is well-defined and the functions φτλ,C and ψτλ,C are continuous.
The space of admissible mixed strategy stopping times is denoted by N .
Usually we write φλ,C instead of φτλ,C and similarly for ψτλ,C and Jτλ,C . We remark that
the requirement that φλ,C and ψλ,C must be continuous in order for τ
λ,C to be admissible
is a technical condition. For τλ,C , τη,D ∈ N we will use the notation
τλ,C ⋄ τη,D(h) = I{τη,D≤τh}τ
η,D + I{τη,D>τh}(τ
λ,C ◦ θτh + τh).
Definition 2.3. A stopping time τˆ ∈ N is said to be a (mixed Markov strategy) equilib-
rium stopping time if the equilibrium condition
lim inf
hց0
Jτˆ (x)− Jτˆ⋄τη,D(h)(x)
Ex(τh)
≥ 0 (2.2)
is satisfied for each τη,D ∈ N and each x ∈ E. If τˆ is an equilibrium stopping time then
Jτˆ (x), x ∈ E, is said to be the corresponding equilibrium value function.
For a motivation of these definitions see Section 2.1. This paper is devoted to the question
of how to find equilibrium stopping times of the type in Definition 2.3.
We denote the characteristic operator of X by AX , i.e. for any function f : E → R,
AXf(x) = lim
hց0
Ex(f(Xτh))− f(x)
Ex(τh)
,
whenever this expression exists. Recall that if f ∈ C2(E) then
AXf(x) = µ(x)f
′(x) +
1
2
σ2(x)f ′′(x).
Throughout the paperwe assume that the functions f, g andh in (2.1) satisfy the following
conditions:
Assumption 2.4.
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• f, h ∈ C2(E) and g ∈ C3(R).
• g(∞) and g(−∞) exist in [−∞,∞].
• f is either bounded from below or above on E. This also holds for h.
2.1 Motivation and discussion of the definitions of mixed strategy
stopping time and equilibrium
We remark that this section is only of motivational value. Let us first describe how to
interpret the time-inconsistent stopping problem (2.1) as an intrapersonal game. The
non-linearity in (2.1) implies that Bellman’s optimality principle does not generally hold
which means that if a stopping rule, e.g. ’stop the first time X exits C’, is optimal (in
the usual sense) given the starting value x, then that stopping rule will generally not be
optimal given another starting value y — note that this is easiest to see for the problem
(1.1) where the payoff depends directly on the current state x. Based on this, the game-
theoretic approach is to view (2.1) as a stopping problem for a person who decides when
to stop the processX but whose preferences change as the current state x changes. This
person is viewed as comprising different versions of herself, one version for each x, and
these x-versions are viewed as agents who play an intrapersonal dynamic game against
each other regarding when to stop the process X . This interpretation is inline with the
invention of Strotz and the literature on time-inconsistent control and stopping problems,
see Section 1.1 and Section 1.2.
Example 2.5. To clarify the notion of pure and mixed strategy stopping times, we here
formulate a simple example in discrete time, in line with the definitions of [1] (cf. the
definition of time-homogeneous randomized stopping time in [1, Section 2]). SupposeX
is a discrete time Markov chain living on {1, 2, 3} and consider a variance problem, i.e.
suppose Jτ (x) = Varx(Xτ ). In this game there are three x-agents, x = 1, 2, 3 whose
potential individual actions are {stop, continue}. For game theory in general, a pure strat-
egy determines the action of an agent based only on payoff relevant information. A pure
strategy for an x-agent is therefore a decision to stop or continue based on x. Moreover,
a strategy profile describes a fully specified configuration of the strategies of all agents
in a game; an example is {1-agent stops, 2-agent stops, 3-agent continues}. It is therefore
natural to interpret stopping times of the type τC as pure strategy profiles. For game the-
ory in general, a mixed strategy is a strategy where an agent uses a randomization device
to select a pure strategy. Hence, an x-agent choosing a mixed strategy corresponds to
this x-agent choosing a biased coin which is flipped every time the state process is at x
and whose outcomewhen flipped determines whether the x-agent stops or continues. An
example of a mixed strategy profile is: {1-agent stops with probability 0.1, 2-agent stops
with probability 0.8, 3-agent stops with probability 1}.
In continous time we interpret the stopping time τλ,C (Definition 2.2) as a mixed strategy
profile for our time-inconsistent stopping time, which we will now motivate. The inter-
pretations of the discrete and continous time mixed strategies, between which there are,
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as we shall see, differences, are as follows. In discrete time (cf. Example 2.5), the interpre-
tation is that if we at a time t−1 have not stopped and at time t observe some state x ∈ C
then we flip a coin with a bias that depends on x and stop at t if the outcome is, say, heads.
In continous time, the interpretation is that if we at time t have not stopped and observe
some state x ∈ C then we stop during (t, t + dt] with probability λ(x)dt; note that this
interpretation relies on λ being continuous, cf. Definition 2.2. Hence, although there are
differences between the discrete and continous time definitions we see that, intuitively,
also for the continous time definition holds that the x-agents use randomization in order
to determine whether to stop or not, and in this sense it is appropriate to interpret τλ,C
as a mixed strategy profile for our continous time time-inconsistent stopping problem.
Let us now motivate our choice of equilibrium condition (2.2), which is an adaptation of
the classical equilibriumdefinition of time-inconsistent stochastic control, see Remark 2.7
below. In general, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is for a dynamic game a strategy
profile that forms a Nash equilibrium at each point in time. The exact mathematical def-
inition of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is to some extent a matter of choice and
should be chosen in order to obtain a desirable economic or game-theoretic interpreta-
tion. For the stopping game of the present paper we would like to define an equilibrium
allowing for the following interpretation: If each x-agent makes her stopping decision in
accordance with the equilibrium stopping time τˆ , then no x-agent would prefer to deviate
from τˆ , in the sense that,
(i) no x-agent would prefer to use a different intensity at the present x than the one
prescribed by τˆ ; in particular,
(ii) no x-agent would prefer to stop when τˆ prescribes continuing, and
(iii) no x-agent would prefer to continue when τˆ prescribes stopping.
Let us first consider the alternative equilibrium condition,
Jτˆ (x) ≥ f(x) + g(h(x)). (2.3)
Although (2.3) allows for the interpretations (i)-(iii) it does so partly because an x-agent
who deviates at x by not stopping immediately when τˆ prescribes stopping immediately
does not affect the actual outcome, because X has continous paths. Hence, X having
continous paths implies that the strategy of stopping immediately at each x is always an
equilibrium under condition (2.3). An advantage with the equilibrium condition of the
present paper (2.2) compared to that of (2.3) is that it allows the x-agent the possibil-
ity of deviating by continuing in a way which generally does affect the actual outcome,
even though X has continous paths. Note, however, that for (2.2) – as well as for other
first-order equilibrium conditions – holds that we cannot know whether an equilibrium
corresponds to a maximum or another type of stationary point. This was in the context of
time-inconsistent stochastic control noted in [4, Remark 3.5] and the reason in our setting
is of course that the numerator in (2.2) can be negative for each fixed h > 0 and still be
in line with (2.2) by vanishing with order o(Ex(τh)). Hence, in general (i)–(iii) are rea-
sonable interpretations of (2.2) only in a restricted sense consistent with this observation
and corresponding intuitively to e.g. an x-agent’s criterion for preferring to stop when an
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equilibrium τˆ prescribes stopping is that the instantaneous expected rate of change (rel-
ative to Ex(τh)) obtained by deviating is necessarily non-positive. Using the observation
in [4, Remark 3.5] as a starting point [23] introduces – in a time-inconsistent stochastic
control framework – the notion of strong equilibrium, which adapted to the problem of
the present paper corresponds to the condition that there should exist a fixed h¯ > 0 such
that for each h ∈ [0, h¯] holds that the numerator of (2.2) is non-negative. The notion of
strong equilibrium for time-inconsistent control is also studied in [18, 19].
Mixed equilibria for time-inconsistent stopping are also considered in [1] in which a
mean-variance problem and a mean-standard deviation problem are studied in a discrete
time Markovian setting. Pure Markov stopping times are, in analogy with the present
paper, defined as entry times into sets in the state space. The definition of mixed strat-
egy stopping times (there also called time-homogeneous randomized stopping times) is in
line with the definition of Example 2.5 and the definition of equilibrium is a discrete time
version of the definition in the present paper. As in the present paper, the authors find
that mixed equilibria coincide with pure equilibria for the mean-variance problem. In [24]
non-exponential discounting is studied in a discrete time Markovian setting. The consid-
ered stopping times are analogous to the pure stopping strategies τC of the present paper.
The definition of equilibrium is a discrete time version of the equilibrium definition in the
present paper. In [20], non-exponential discounting is studied in an Itô diffusion setting.
Also here the considered stopping times are analogous to the pure stopping strategies of
the present paper. An equilibrium in [20] is defined as a fixed point of an operator Θ
which describes the game-theoretic reasoning of each agent, where intuitively Θ takes
as input a proposed stopping policy and produces as output the best responses of each
agent; see [20, Sec. 3.1] and in particular [20, Definition 3.7]. In particular, it holds that
deviation from a proposed equilibrium strategy at a particular starting point x does not
change the outcome when the underlying process has continuous paths and that stop-
ping immediately at each x is always an equilibrium in this case, cf. [20, Remark 3.9];
however, we remark that if the underlying process has jumps then the strategy of stop-
ping immediately at each x may no longer be an equilibrium. In [22], non-exponential
discounting and the strategies and equilibrium of [20] are studied for a more general one-
dimensional Markovian process. An optimality criterion for equilibria is also proposed
and studied. In [21] a general time-inconsistent stopping problem is studied in the set-
ting of a strong Markov process . Both naive agents, who continuously re-optimize, and
sophisticated agents, i.e. the approach of the present paper, are studied. The strategies and
the equilibrium for the sophisticated agents are defined as in [20] and immediate stopping
is always an equilibrium, cf. [21, Remark 2.6].
The equilibrium definitions of e.g. [1, 24] are, as we have mentioned, discrete time ver-
sions of the equilibrium in the present paper and [9], but they are also discrete time ver-
sions of the equilibrium in e.g. [20], and the discrete time equilibrium definition seems
unanimous.
Remark 2.6. The choice of equilibrium definition is a modeling choice which should be
made in accordance with the economic or game-theoretic interpretation that one wants.
The existence of essentially different equilibrium definitions in the literature is therefore
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natural.
Remark 2.7. The equilibrium condition (2.2) is in line with the one in [9] and inspired by
time-inconsistent stopping problems in financial economics, see e.g. [12]. It can also be
seen as an adaptation of the usual equilibrium definition for time-inconsistent stochastic
control problems, see [4, 5, 29] and the references therein; the main similarity between
these two equilibrium definitions is that they can be said to be first order conditions,
with the interpretation that the x-agent decideswhat happens on an infinitesimal interval
around her. In the case of stochastic control of a diffusion this is necessary since changing
the control only at a point has no effect on the control process. Note however, that the
reason we have chosen a first-order equilibrium condition in the present paper is not
because of mathematical necessity, but because it corresponds to the interpretation that
we want, as discussed above. We also mention that since the selection of mixed strategy
stopping times τλ,C involves control of λ follows that the stopping problem of the present
paper becomes in this sense also a control problem.
Remark 2.8. To avoid confusion we want to reiterate that a mixed strategy stopping time
τλ,C is in the present paper not a strategy of an agent in the game, instead it is a spec-
ification of the strategies of all agents in the game (i.e. a strategy profile). Similarly, an
equilibrium strategy τˆ is a full specification of the strategies of all agents.
Remark 2.9. In [40] a continuous-timeDynkin game withmixed strategies defined as ran-
domized stopping times is studied. It is instructive to note that the number of players in
the game of this paper is finite while the number of players in the game of the present
paper is uncountable; in the framework of the present paper it is the Cox process con-
struction of mixed stopping strategies that makes it possible to identifymixed equilibrium
strategies. In order to choose an appropriate mathematical definition of mixed strategy
one must consider the particular game being studied. In particular, the definition of a
mixed strategy should have the interpretation that the agents in the game that is being
studied use randomization to select pure strategies. It is therefore not surprising that the
definition for a mixed strategy in e.g. [40] is different from that of the present paper. Intu-
itively, in the game of [40] each of the two agents uses randomization to select a stopping
time and the mixed strategy profile that they jointly select is hence a pair of randomized
stopping times; whereas in the present paper all x-agents jointly select a mixed strategy
profile in the form of a stopping time of the kind τλ,C .
Remark 2.10. The type of stopping time we consider in Definition 2.2 can be seen to be a
particular type of randomized stopping time, in particular τλ can be identified with the
randomized stopping time inf{t ≥ 0 :
∫ t
0 λ(Xs)ds ≥ E1} whereE1 is a unit exponential
random variable independent ofX see e.g. [27, Sec. 2].
3 Equilibrium conditions
This section contains a characterization of the equilibrium, see Theorem 3.2. It also con-
tains other necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium, see Theorem 3.5, Theorem
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3.6 and Theorem 3.7. These are the main results of the present paper. They rely on the re-
sults found in the appendix whichmainly contain explicit expressions for the type of limit
that is found in the left side of the equilibrium condition (2.2) for different values of the
initial state, see Lemma 5.2, Lemma 5.3 and Lemma 5.4. The results in the appendix rely
to a large extent on arguments similar to those in the proof of Lemma 3.1 and standard
Taylor expansion. Theorem 3.5 and Theorem 3.6 rely on Proposition 3.3.
Lemma 3.1. For any τλ,C , τη,D ∈ N and x ∈ D,
lim
hց0
φτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x)− φτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)
Ex(τh)
= η(x)(φλ,C(x)− f(x)).
Proof. Recall that D is open by definition of N . This implies that for any x ∈ D there
exists a constant h¯ > 0 such that τh < τ
D for each 0 < h ≤ h¯ (a.s.). Hence, for 0 < h ≤ h¯,
τλ,C ⋄ τη,D(h) = I{τη,D≤τh}τ
η,D + I{τη,D>τh}(τ
λ,C ◦ θτh + τh)
= I{τη≤τh}τ
η + I{τη>τh}(τ
λ,C ◦ θτh + τh).
It follows that
f
(
Xτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)
)
= I{τη,D≤τh}f
(
Xτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)
)
+ I{τη,D>τh}f
(
Xτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)
)
= I{τη≤τh}f (Xτη ) + I{τη>τh}f
(
Xτλ,C◦θτh+τh
)
. (3.1)
Using the above, the properties of the Poisson process and by conditioning on the filtra-
tion generated byX , we obtain, for 0 < h ≤ h¯, (here ηt := η(Xt))
φτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x)− φτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)
= Ex
(
I{τη≤τh}
(
f
(
Xτλ,C◦θτh+τh
)
− f (Xτη)
))
= Ex
(∫ ∞
0
ηte
−
∫ t
0
ηsdsI{t≤τh}
(
f
(
Xτλ,C◦θτh+τh
)
− f (Xt)
)
dt
)
= Ex
(
f
(
Xτλ,C◦θτh+τh
)∫ τh
0
ηte
−
∫ t
0
ηsdsdt−
∫ τh
0
ηte
−
∫ t
0
ηsdsf (Xt) dt
)
.
By conditioning on Fτh and the strong Markov property we thus obtain
φτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x)− φτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)
= Ex
(∫ τh
0
ηte
−
∫ t
0
ηsdsdtEx
(
f
(
Xτλ,C◦θτh+τh
)
|Fτh
)
−
∫ τh
0
ηte
−
∫ t
0
ηsdsf (Xt) dt
)
= Ex
(∫ τh
0
ηte
−
∫ t
0
ηsdsdtφλ,C (Xτh)−
∫ τh
0
ηte
−
∫ t
0
ηsdsf (Xt) dt
)
= Ex
(∫ τh
0
ηte
−
∫ t
0
ηsds(φλ,C (Xτh)− f (Xt))dt
)
. (3.2)
10
Now use the continuity of the functions f, η, φλ,C and the paths of X , and that X is
bounded on [0, τh], to obtain
lim
hց0
φτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x)− φτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)
Ex(τh)
= lim
hց0
Ex
(∫ τh
0 η(Xt)e
−
∫ t
0
η(Xs)ds (φλ,C (Xτh)− f (Xt)) dt
)
Ex(τh)
= η(x) (φλ,C(x)− f(x)) . (3.3)
The last step in (3.3) contains a type of limit taking that is used throughout the paper, but
which we prove only in what follows. In the rest of the proof we suppress the sub-index
λ,C . First note that,∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ex
(∫ τh
0 η(Xt)e
−
∫ t
0
η(Xs)ds (φ (Xτh)− f (Xt)) dt
)
Ex(τh)
− η(x) (φ(x) − f(x))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣Ex (∫ τh0 η(Xt)(1− e− ∫ t0 η(Xs)ds) (φ (Xτh)− f (Xt)) dt)∣∣∣
Ex(τh)
+
∣∣Ex (∫ τh0 (η(Xt) (φ (Xτh)− f (Xt))− η(x) (φ(x)− f(x))) dt)∣∣
Ex(τh)
.
From the continuity of the functions η, φ, f and trajectories of X follows,∣∣Ex (∫ τh0 (η(Xt) (φ (Xτh)− f (Xt))− η(x) (φ(x)− f(x))) dt)∣∣
Ex(τh)
≤ sup
y1,y2∈(x−h,x+h)
|η(y1) (φ (y2)− f (y1))− η(x) (φ(x) − f(x))| → 0, as hց 0.
Moreover, for ch := supy1,y2∈(x−h,x+h) |η(y1) (φ (y2)− f (y1))| holds,∣∣∣Ex (∫ τh0 η(Xt)(1− e− ∫ t0 η(Xs)ds) (φ (Xτh)− f (Xt)) dt)∣∣∣
Ex(τh)
≤ ch
∣∣∣Ex (∫ τh0 (1− e− ∫ τh0 η(Xs)ds) dt)
∣∣∣
Ex(τh)
= ch
∣∣∣Ex ((1− e− ∫ τh0 η(Xs)ds) τh)∣∣∣
Ex(τh)
≤ ch
∣∣Ex (τh ∫ τh0 η(Xt)dt)∣∣
Ex(τh)
≤ ch sup
y∈(x−h,x+h)
η(y)
∣∣Ex (τ2h)∣∣
Ex(τh)
→ 0, as hց 0,
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where we used the fact that 1−e−y ≤ y for y ≥ 0 and Lemma 5.5. From the observations
above follows the last step in (3.3).
We are now ready to present the first main result, which characterizes the equilibrium.
Theorem 3.2. A stopping time τλ,C ∈ N is an equilibrium stopping time if and only if it
is a solution to the following system,
Jλ,C(x)− f(x)− g(h(x)) ≥ 0, for x ∈ C, (I)
AXf(x) + g
′(h(x))AXh(x) ≤ 0, for x ∈ int(C
c), (II)
f(x)− φλ,C(x) + g
′(ψλ,C(x)) (h(x)− ψλ,C(x)) = 0, for x ∈ C with λ(x) > 0, (III)
f(x)− φλ,C(x) + g
′(ψλ,C(x)) (h(x)− ψλ,C(x)) ≤ 0, for x ∈ C with λ(x) = 0, (IV)
lim inf
hց0
−a(x, h)
Ex(τh)
≥ 0, for x ∈ ∂C , (V)
where
a(x, h) := Ex (φλ,C(Xτh))− φλ,C(x) + g (Ex (ψλ,C(Xτh)))− g(ψλ,C(x)). (3.4)
See the appendix for a proof of Theorem 3.2. We will use the following general result.
Proposition 3.3. Consider a fixed x ∈ E and a function k : E → R. Suppose that there
exists a constant h¯ > 0 such that k is C2 on [x − h¯, x] and [x, x + h¯] and continuous on
[x− h¯, x+ h¯], then
lim
hց0
(Ex(k(Xτh))− k(x))
2
Ex(τh)
=
(
k′(x+)− k′(x−)
2
)2
σ2(x).
In particular, for the local time ofX at x, denoted by lxt (X), it holds that
lim
hց0
Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)2
Ex(τh)
= σ2(x).
Proof. Use the Itô-Tanaka formula, see e.g. [35] or [36, p. 75], to obtain, for 0 < h ≤ h¯,
k(Xτh)− k(x) =
∫ τh
0
AXk(Xt)I{Xt 6=x}dt+
∫ τh
0
k′(Xt)σ(Xt)I{Xt 6=x}dWt
+
1
2
∫ τh
0
(
k′(Xt+)− k
′(Xt−)
)
I{Xt=x}dl
x
t (X)
=
∫ τh
0
AXk(Xt)I{Xt 6=x}dt+
∫ τh
0
k′(Xt)σ(Xt)I{Xt 6=x}dWt
+
1
2
(
k′(x+)− k′(x−)
)
lxτh(X).
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Thus,
lim
hց0
(Ex(k(Xτh))− k(x))
2
Ex(τh)
= lim
hց0
(
Ex
(∫ τh
0 AXk(Xt)I{Xt 6=x}dt
)
+ 12 (k
′(x+)− k′(x−))Ex
(
lxτh(X)
))2
Ex(τh)
.(3.5)
Observe that limhց0 Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)
= 0, limhց0 Ex
(∫ τh
0 AXk(Xt)I{Xt 6=x}dt
)
= 0 and
limhց0
Ex(
∫ τh
0
AXk(Xt)I{Xt 6=x}dt)
Ex(τh)
is finite. Thus, expansion of the square in (3.5) gives,
lim
hց0
(Ex(k(Xτh))− k(x))
2
Ex(τh)
=
(
(k′(x+)− k′(x−))
2
)2
lim
hց0
Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)2
Ex(τh)
. (3.6)
Applying the result in (3.6) for k(y) := |y − x| (recall that x is fixed) gives us
lim
hց0
(Ex(|Xτh − x|))
2
Ex(τh)
=
(
(1− (−1))
2
)2
lim
hց0
Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)2
Ex(τh)
= lim
hց0
Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)2
Ex(τh)
. (3.7)
However, it is also easy to see that,
lim
hց0
(Ex(|Xτh − x|))
2
Ex(τh)
= lim
hց0
(ph|x+ h− x|+ (1− ph)|x− h− x|)
2
Ex(τh)
= lim
hց0
h2
Ex(τh)
, (3.8)
where ph := Px(Xτh = x+h). The result follows from (3.6), (3.7), (3.8) and the following
limit which is proved in Lemma 5.5,
lim
hց0
h2
Ex(τh)
= σ2(x). (3.9)
Remark 3.4. The limit (3.9) was also recently proved in [15]. In Lemma 5.5 we prove (3.9)
using Itô’s formula and the optional sampling theorem. In [15] the proof of (3.9) relies on
a representation of the denominator based on the scale function and the speed measure
of the diffusion X and standard limit arguments, e.g. l’Hospital’s rule.
Theorem 3.5 below presents a smooth fit condition that an equilibrium value function
must satisfy at any x ∈ ∂C , under additional assumptions. We use this result when
making an ansatz to finding an equilibrium stopping time in Section 4.2.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose that τλ,C is an equilibrium stopping time. For a fixed x ∈ ∂C , if
13
the functions φλ,C and ψλ,C are C
2 on [x − h¯, x] and [x, x + h¯] for some constant h¯ > 0,
then the equilibrium value function Jλ,C satisfies smooth fit in the sense that
J ′λ,C(x) = f
′(x) + g′(h(x))h′(x).
Proof. Consider a fixed x ∈ ∂C . For any ǫ, satisfying x + ǫ ∈ E (both negative and
positive such ǫ exist since E is open and ∂C is the boundary of C in E), it holds that
Jλ,C(x+ ǫ) ≥ f(x+ ǫ) + g(h(x + ǫ)).
To see this use that this inequality is an equality when x + ǫ /∈ C , and condition (I) for
the case x + ǫ ∈ C . Moreover, since x ∈ ∂C it follows that Jλ,C(x) = f(x) + g(h(x)).
Hence,
Jλ,C(x+ ǫ)− Jλ,C(x) ≥ f(x+ ǫ)− f(x) + g(h(x + ǫ))− g(h(x)).
If ǫ < 0 it follows that
Jλ,C(x+ ǫ)− Jλ,C(x)
ǫ
≤
f(x+ ǫ)− f(x)
ǫ
+
g(h(x + ǫ))− g(h(x))
ǫ
.
Hence, the left derivative satisfies J
′(−)
λ,C (x) ≤ f
′(x)+g′(h(x))h′(x). The right derivative
can be similarly dealt with and we thus obtain
J
′(−)
λ,C (x) ≤ f
′(x) + g′(h(x))h′(x) ≤ J
′(+)
λ,C (x). (3.10)
Let us now prove that if we would not have smooth fit then condition (V) would be vio-
lated and hence smooth fit must hold, by Theorem 3.2. Note that if smooth fit would not
hold then J
′(+)
λ,C (x)− J
′(−)
λ,C (x) > 0, cf. (3.10), which is equivalent to
φ′λ,C(x+) + g
′(ψλ,C(x))ψ
′
λ,C(x+) > φ
′
λ,C(x−) + g
′(ψλ,C(x))ψ
′
λ,C (x−).
To see this use that Jλ,C(x) = φλ,C(x) + g(ψλ,C (x)) and the chain rule, and then the
differentiability assumptions (i.e. φλ,C and ψλ,C are C
2 on [x− h¯, x] and [x, x + h¯]) and
continuity (of φλ,C andψλ,C , cf. admissibility, Definition 2.2). Rewrite the equation above
as
φ′λ,C(x+)− φ
′
λ,C(x−) + g
′(ψλ,C(x))(ψ
′
λ,C(x+)− ψ
′
λ,C(x−)) > 0. (3.11)
The differentiability assumptions imply that we can use the Itô-Tanaka formula to obtain,
for 0 < h < h¯,
φλ,C(Xτh)− φλ,C(x)
=
∫ τh
0
AXφλ,C(Xt)I{Xt 6=x}dt+
∫ τh
0
φ′λ,C(Xt)σ(Xt)I{Xt 6=x}dWt
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+
1
2
(
φ′λ,C(x+)− φ
′
λ,C(x−)
)
lxτh(X).
Thus,
Ex (φλ,C(Xτh))− φλ,C(x) = a1(h) + a2 Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)
,
for a1(h) := Ex
(∫ τh
0 AXφλ,C(Xt)I{Xt 6=x}dt
)
and a2 :=
1
2(φ
′
λ,C(x+)−φ
′
λ,C(x−)). Sim-
ilarly,
Ex (ψλ,C(Xτh))− ψλ,C(x) = b1(h) + b2 Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)
,
for b1(h) := Ex
(∫ τh
0 AXψλ,C(Xt)I{Xt 6=x}dt
)
and b2 :=
1
2(ψ
′
λ,C(x+) − ψ
′
λ,C(x−)).
Hence, using standard Taylor expansion of the function g we write a(x, h) in (3.4) as,
a(x, h) = a1(h) + a2 Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)
+ g′(ψλ,C(x)){b1(h) + b2 Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)
}
+
1
2
g′′(ψλ,C(x)){b1(h) + b2 Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)
}2
+
1
6
g′′′(ch){b1(h) + b2 Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)
}3,
where ch is a constant between ψλ,C(x) and ψλ,C(x)+ b1(h)+ b2 Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)
. This can
be written as,
−a(x, h)
Ex(τh)
= −
a1(h)
Ex(τh)
− g′(ψλ,C(x))
b1(h)
Ex(τh)
(3.12)
− (a2 + g
′(ψλ,C(x))b2)
Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)
Ex(τh)
(3.13)
−
1
2
g′′(ψλ,C(x))
(Ex (ψλ,C(Xτh))− ψλ,C(x))
2
Ex(τh)
(3.14)
−
1
6
g′′′(ch)
(Ex (ψλ,C(Xτh))− ψλ,C(x))
3
Ex(τh)
. (3.15)
Let us see what happens to the liminf of
−a(x,h)
Ex(τh)
when sending hց 0: The liminf of the
terms in (3.12) are finite due to the differentiability assumptions for φλ,C and ψλ,C . The
term in (3.13) can be written as
− (a2 + g
′(ψλ,C(x))b2)
Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)
Ex(τh)
= −
1
2
(
φ′λ,C(x+)− φ
′
λ,C(x−) + g
′(ψλ,C(x))(ψ
′
λ,C (x+)− ψ
′
λ,C(x−))
)
×
Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)
Ex(τh)
.
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From Proposition 3.3 we know that limhց0
Ex
(
lxτh
(X)
)
2
Ex(τh)
= σ2(x), where the limits of the
numerator and the denominator are both zero, and σ(x) > 0 by assumption. Hence,
lim
hց0
Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)
Ex(τh)
= lim
hց0
Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)2
Ex(τh)
1
Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)
= σ2(x) lim
hց0
1
Ex
(
lxτh(X)
)
=∞.
Thus, from the contradiction assumption (3.11) follows that the liminf of the term in (3.13)
is equal to −∞. Proposition 3.3 gives an explicit expression for the liminf of the term in
(3.14), which in particular implies that this limit is finite. The liminf of the term in (3.15)
vanishes, to see this use that the limit of the ratio in (3.14) is finite and Ex (ψλ,C(Xτh))−
ψλ,C(x) → 0 (cf. continuity of ψλ,C ). This implies that condition (V) would indeed be
violated if (3.11) were true and smooth fit must therefore hold.
Theorem 3.2 presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a stopping time τλ,C to be
an equilibrium stopping time. If we for an equilibrium stopping time candidate τλ,C can
find explicit expressions for the functions φλ,C and ψλ,C then it is easy to verify if con-
ditions (I)–(IV) hold whereas condition (V) is not necessarily easy to verify. Theorem 3.6
below presents a more easily verified characterization of condition (V), given additional
differentiability conditions. We will use Theorem 3.6 to verify an ansatz to finding an
equilibrium in Section 4.2.
Theorem 3.6. Consider a stopping time τλ,C ∈ N . If for any fixed x ∈ ∂C there exists a
constant h¯ > 0 such that the functions φλ,C and ψλ,C are C
2 on [x− h¯, x] and [x, x+ h¯] and
such that the function φλ,C(·) + g
′(ψλ,C(x))ψλ,C (·) is C
1 on [x− h¯, x+ h¯] then condition
(V) is equivalent to,
AXφλ,C(x+) + g
′(ψλ,C(x))AXψλ,C(x+) +AXφλ,C(x−) + g
′(ψλ,C(x))AXψλ,C(x−)
+ g′′(ψλ,C(x))
(
ψ′λ,C(x+)− ψ
′
λ,C(x−)
2
)2
σ2(x) ≤ 0. (3.16)
Proof. Consider an arbitrary x ∈ ∂C . Use the Itô-Tanaka formula to arrive at the same
expression as in (3.12)– (3.15). Note that the C1 assumption in the statement of the theo-
rem directly implies that a2 + g
′(ψλ,C(x))b2 = 0. This implies, using (3.12)–(3.15), that
the expression that we take the limit of in (V) can be written as
−a(x, h)
Ex(τh)
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= −
Ex
(∫ τh
0
(
AXφλ,C(Xt)I{Xt 6=x} + g
′(ψλ,C(x))AXψλ,C(Xt)I{Xt 6=x}
)
dt
)
Ex(τh)
−
1
2
g′′(ψλ,C(x))
(Ex (ψλ,C(Xτh))− ψλ,C(x))
2
Ex(τh)
− ...
where the last term, which has been notationally suppressed, converges to zero as h ց
0 (cf. the end the proof of Theorem 3.5). The differentiability assumptions and basic
properties of diffusions imply that
lim
hց0
(
Ex
(∫ τh
0
(
AXφλ,C(Xt)I{Xt 6=x} + g
′(ψλ,C(x))AXψλ,C(Xt)I{Xt 6=x}
)
dt
)
Ex(τh)
)
=
1
2
(
AXφλ,C(x+) + g
′(ψλ,C(x))AXψλ,C(x+)
)
+
1
2
(
AXφλ,C(x−) + g
′(ψλ,C(x))AXψλ,C(x−)
)
.
Now use Proposition 3.3 to obtain the result.
Theorem 3.7 below presents a necessary condition for equilibria for x ∈ C in the case
that the equilibrium intensity function is strictly positive, under additional assumptions.
This result will be used when we make an ansatz to finding an equilibrium stopping time
in Section 4.1.
Theorem 3.7. Suppose that τλ,C is an equilibrium stopping time with λ(x) > 0 for x ∈ C
and that ψλ,C is C
2 on C . Then ψλ,C satisfies the (non-linear) ODE
−
(
µ(x)ψ′λ,C(x) +
1
2
σ2(x)ψ′′λ,C(x)
)
(h(x) − ψλ,C(x))g
′′(ψλ,C(x))
= µ(x){f ′(x) + h′(x)g′(ψλ,C(x))} +
1
2
σ2(x){f ′′(x) + d(x)}, for x ∈ C, (3.17)
where
d(x) :=g′′′(ψλ,C(x))(ψ
′
λ,C (x))
2 (h(x)− ψλ,C(x))
+ 2g′′(ψλ,C(x))ψ
′
λ,C(x)(h
′(x)− ψ′λ,C(x)) + g
′(ψλ,C(x))h
′′(x). (3.18)
Moreover, the equilibrium intensity function λ satisfies
λ(x)(h(x) − ψλ,C(x))
2g′′(ψλ,C(x))
= µ(x){f ′(x) + h′(x)g′(ψλ,C(x))} +
1
2
σ2(x){f ′′(x) + d(x)}, for x ∈ C. (3.19)
Proof. Suppose that τλ,C is an equilibrium stopping time with λ(x) > 0 for x ∈ C .
Consider an arbitrary fixed x ∈ C . By definition Jλ,C(x) = φλ,C(x) + g(ψλ,C(x)) and
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hence
AX(Jλ,C(x)− φλ,C(x)− g(ψλ,C(x))) = 0. (3.20)
Condition (III) holds by Theorem 3.2 and from simple calculations follows,
Jλ,C(x)− φλ,C(x)− g(ψλ,C(x))
= f(x)− φλ,C(x) + g
′(ψλ,C(x)) (h(x)− ψλ,C(x)) . (3.21)
We will notationally suppress λ,C and (x) in the rest of the proof. From (3.20) and (3.21)
follows that AXf −AXφ+AX (g
′(ψ) (h− ψ)) = 0 which implies that
AXφ = AXf +AX
(
g′(ψ) (h− ψ)
)
. (3.22)
Now use Lemma 5.1 and then condition (III) to see that
AXφ = λ(φ− f)
= λg′(ψ) (h− ψ) . (3.23)
Let us investigate the expressions in the right side of (3.22). The assumed differentiability
implies that
AXf = µf
′ +
1
2
σ2f ′′, and
AX
(
g′(ψ) (h− ψ)
)
= µ(g′(ψ) (h− ψ))′ +
1
2
σ2(g′(ψ) (h− ψ))′′.
Use standard differentiation rules to find that the derivatives in the last expression can be
written as
(g′(ψ) (h− ψ))′ = ψ′b+ h′g′(ψ),
where we use the temporary notation b := g′′(ψ) (h− ψ)− g′(ψ), and
(g′(ψ) (h− ψ))′′ = d+ ψ′′b,
where d is defined in (3.18). It follows that the right side of (3.22) can be written as
AXf +AX
(
g′(ψ) (h− ψ)
)
= µ{f ′ + h′g′(ψ)}+
1
2
σ2{f ′′ + d}+ b{µψ′ +
1
2
σ2ψ′′}
= µ{f ′ + h′g′(ψ)}+
1
2
σ2{f ′′ + d}+ bAXψ
= µ{f ′ + h′g′(ψ)}+
1
2
σ2{f ′′ + d}+ bλ(ψ − h),
where we relied on Lemma 5.1 (which analogously holds also for the function ψ) and the
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differential operator form of AX . Use the equality above, (3.22) and (3.23) to obtain
λg′(ψ) (h− ψ) = µ{f ′ + h′g′(ψ)}+
1
2
σ2{f ′′ + d}+ bλ(ψ − h).
This implies that
λ (h− ψ) {g′(ψ) + b} = µ{f ′ + h′g′(ψ)}+
1
2
σ2{f ′′ + d}.
Use that b + g′(ψ) = g′′(ψ) (h− ψ) to see that (3.19) follows. Now use Lemma 5.1
to obtain AXψ = λ(ψ − h). Using the assumed differentiability for ψ we also obtain
AXψ = µψ
′ + 12σ
2ψ′′. Hence, λ(h − ψ) = −
(
µψ′ + 12σ
2ψ′′
)
which, together with
(3.19), implies that (3.17) holds.
4 Examples
The main objectives of the present paper are to formulate and solve time-inconsistent
stopping problems of the type (2.1) and to define mixed strategies for these problems. In
this section we first study a variance problem for which it turns out a mixed equilibrium
but no pure equilibrium exists. Second, we study a mean-variance problem for which it
turns out a pure equilibrium or no equilibrium exists depending on the parameters, in
particular there is no mixed equilibrium. We also present a simple example with two
different equilibria, showing that we cannot generally expect equilibrium uniqueness.
4.1 A variance stopping problem
The variance stopping problem corresponds to the time-inconsistent problem of trying
to maximize
Varx(Xτ ).
An economic motivation for a variance stopping problem is found in [33] and the refer-
ences therein. Variance stopping problems are also studied in [13, 14] using randomized
stopping times. We also refer to [7, 8]. All these references consider the problem from
the perspective of the pre-commitment approach.
The variance problem is given by f(x) := x2, g(x) := −x2 and h(x) := x. To see this
note that
Jτ (x) = φτ (x) + g(ψτ (x))
= Ex(X
2
τ )− E
2
x(Xτ )
= Varx(Xτ ).
We consider a positive state processX . In this case Assumption 2.4 is satisfied. It follows
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that
g′(ψλ,C(x)) = −2ψλ,C(x) and Jλ,C(x) = φλ,C(x)− ψ
2
λ,C(x). (4.1)
Hence, simple calculations yield
f(x)− φλ,C(x) + g
′(ψλ,C(x)) (h(x) − ψλ,C(x))
= −(φλ,C(x)− ψ
2
λ,C(x)) + x
2 − 2xψλ,C(x) + ψ
2
λ,C(x)
= −Jλ,C(x) + (ψλ,C(x)− x)
2. (4.2)
An equilibrium stopping time should typically not recommend immediate stopping since
this corresponds to minimal variance, see also Remark 4.4 below. Hence, we make an
ansatz with C = E. Specifically, we make the ansatz that an equilibrium stopping time
is given by τλ,E for some strictly positive intensity function λwhich is to be determined.
We will use the notation τλ,E = τλ, ψλ,E = ψλ etc.
We immediately obtain the following result.
Theorem 4.1. A stopping time τλ ∈ N , with λ(x) > 0 for each x ∈ E, is an equilibrium
stopping time for the variance problem if and only if
Jλ(x) = (ψλ(x)− x)
2, for x ∈ E. (4.3)
Moreover, if (4.3) holds then Jλ given by (4.3) is the corresponding equilibrium value function.
Proof. Use that h(x) = x, −f(x) − g(x) = 0 and (4.2) to see that if (4.3) holds then (I)
and (III) hold, whereas (II), (IV) and (V) can be considered trivially fulfilled, since we use
C = E and λ(x) > 0. Now, if (III) holds then it follows from (4.2) and C = E that (4.3)
holds. Thus, the first assertion follows from Theorem 3.2. The second assertion follows
immediately.
Let us use the ODE condition (3.17) in Theorem 3.7 to identify a candidate for ψλ and
then use the result (3.19) to identify the corresponding candidate equilibrium intensity
function λ. In the present case the ODE (3.17) is
−
(
µ(x)ψ′λ(x) +
1
2
σ2(x)ψ′′λ(x)
)
(x− ψλ(x))(−2)
= µ(x){2x− 2ψλ(x)}+
1
2
σ2(x){2 + d(x)},
with d(x) = 4(ψ′λ(x))
2 − 4ψ′λ(x), where we used (4.1), f
′(x) = 2x, g′′′(x) = 0 etc. We
note that if x− ψλ(x) 6= 0, then the ODE simplifies to
µ(x)ψ′λ(x) +
1
2
σ2(x)ψ′′λ(x) = µ(x) +
1
2
σ2(x)
(ψ′λ(x)− 1)
2 + (ψ′λ(x))
2
x− ψλ(x)
. (4.4)
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In case X is a geometric Brownian motion it turns out that the problem can be solved
explicitly. Thus, from now we assume (in this example) that
dXt = µXtdt+ σXtdWt. (4.5)
In this case (4.4) becomes
µx(ψ′λ(x)− 1) +
1
2
σ2x2
(
ψ′′λ(x)−
(ψ′λ(x)− 1)
2 + (ψ′λ(x))
2
x− ψλ(x)
)
= 0. (4.6)
The ODE (4.6) has, under appropriate assumptions for the constants µ and σ, one solution
(at least) on the form ψλ(x) = cx for some constant c 6= 0, 1. To see this use that
ψ′′λ(x) = (cx)
′′ = 0 and that x > 0, since E = (0,∞) for the GBM. Now use (3.19) and
the candidate ψλ(x) = cx to obtain the corresponding candidate intensity
λ(x) =
µ(x){f ′(x) + h′(x)g′(ψλ(x))} +
1
2σ
2(x){f ′′(x) + d(x).}
(h(x) − ψλ(x))2g′′(ψλ(x))
=
µ{1− c}+ 12σ
2{1 + 2c2 − 2c.}
−(1− c)2
. (4.7)
This means the candidate solution ψλ(x) = cx corresponds to using a constant intensity
(depending on the constant c). This constant candidate intensity could, with some effort,
be found by identifying the constant(s) c such that ψλ(x) = cx solves (4.6), and inserting
this c into (4.7) and thereby obtaining a corresponding constant equilibrium intensity can-
didate. We shall, however, instead use Theorem 4.1 to identify the constant equilibrium
intensity (it turns out that only one constant equilibrium intensity exists) and thereby
verify that the ansatz works. This is done in the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.2. Let X be given by (4.5) where the constants µ and σ satisfy σ2 > 0 and
2µ + σ2 < 0. (4.8)
Then τλ, with
λ =
√
−µ2(2µ + σ2)
σ2
, (4.9)
is an equilibrium stopping time. The corresponding equilibrium value function is
Jλ(x) =
1(√
−(2µ+σ2)
σ2
+ 1
)2x2.
Remark 4.3. From the formula for the variance of the log-normal Xt it follows that
limt→∞ Varx(Xt) = 0 for any x ∈ E if (4.8) holds, whereas limt→∞ Varx(Xt) = ∞ for
any x ∈ E if (4.8) does not hold. Hence, we only consider the case when (4.8) holds. We
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Figure 1 The equilibrium value function x 7→ Jλ(x), where λ is given by (4.9), for the parameters
µ = −0.1 and σ2 = 0.15. In this case λ ≈ 0.0577.
remark that condition (4.8) is also used in [33].
Remark 4.4. For our variance problem holds, as expected, that an equilibrium stopping
time cannot recommend immediate stopping at any x. To see this first verify that (II) is
violated for x ∈ int(Cc). Moreover, if Cc has no interior then (V) is violated at every
x ∈ ∂C ; which can be shown using arguments similar to those in the proof of Theorem
4.6 below and in particular (4.13) and (4.16).
Proof. We remark that it follows from the calculations below that τλ is admissible. Using
that Xt = xe
(µ− 1
2
σ2)t+σWt is log-normal and conditioning on the exponentially dis-
tributed stopping time τλ we directly obtain
ψλ(x) = Ex(Xτλ) =
λ
λ− µ
x and φλ(x) = Ex(X
2
τλ
) =
λ
λ− 2µ− σ2
x2.
Here we relied on the denominators being positive, which follows directly from λ > 0
and µ < 0, and λ > 0 and (4.8) respectively; where (4.8) implied that µ < 0 and λ > 0. It
follows that
ψ2λ(x) =
λ2
(λ− µ)2
x2, (ψλ(x)− x)
2 =
µ2
(λ− µ)2
x2.
Using (4.1) and (4.9) we thus obtain, for any fixed x ∈ E,
Jλ(x)− (ψλ(x)− x)
2
x2
=
φλ(x)− ψ
2
λ(x)− (ψλ(x)− x)
2
x2
=
2µ3 + µ2σ2 + σ2λ2
(λ− 2µ − σ2)(λ− µ)2
.
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From Theorem 4.1 it therefore follows that τλ is an equilibrium stopping timewhen 2µ3+
µ2σ2 + σ2λ2 = 0, i.e. when λ satisfies λ2 = −µ
2(2µ+σ2)
σ2
. This proves the first assertion.
Using the calculations above, µ < 0 and Theorem 4.1 it is easy to find the equilibrium
value function.
Remark 4.5. In [14], the results from [33] on the pre-commitment version of the variance
stopping problem are generalized to underlying geometric Lévy processes. In this paper,
we have decided to developed the theory only for underlying diffusion processes to avoid
certain technical difficulties. Therefore, applying our time-consistent approach to under-
lying jump processes would need some further work that we do not carry out here. We,
nonetheless, want to mention that obtaining equilibrium conditions of the form (4.3) for
the variance problem for underlying geometric Lévy processes of the formXt = X0e
Lt ,
L a Lévy process, can also be obtained. It is then interesting to note that considering τλ
for a constant λ > 0 yields – under suitable integrability conditions – that
ψλ(x) = E1(Xτλ)x = aλx, aλ =
λ
λ−ΨL(1)
and
φλ(x) = E1(X
2
τλ
)x2 = bλx
2, bλ =
λ
λ−Ψ2L(1)
,
where Ψ denotes the Laplace exponent. Hence, a similar calculation as in the previous
proof yields both a formula for λ and the corresponding equilibrium value function also
in this case.
4.2 A mean-variance stopping problem
Mean-variance optimization is one of the classical problems in financial economics. It
was first studied in the context of optimal portfolio allocation in the seminal paper [30].
A vast number of papers on the topic have since then been published. For short surveys
and economic motivation of mean-variance problems we refer to [6, 34] and the refer-
ences therein. The mean-variance stopping problem corresponds to the time-inconsistent
problem of trying to maximize
Ex(Xτ )− γVarx(Xτ ), with γ > 0.
Here γ is a given constant representing risk-aversion. In [34] a mean-variance stopping
problem for a geometric Brownian motion is studied using the dynamic optimality ap-
proach and the pre-commitment approach. In [1] a mean-variance stopping problem for
a general discrete time Markov chain is studied, see also Section 2.1. In [6] a mean-
variance control problem is studied using the general game-theoretic framework for time-
inconsistent stochastic control of [4].
The mean-variance stopping problem is given by f(x) := −γx2, g(x) := x + γx2 and
h(x) := x. To see this note that
Jτ (x) = φτ (x) + g(ψτ (x))
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= −γ Ex(X
2
τ ) + Ex(Xτ ) + γ E
2
x(Xτ )
= Ex(Xτ )− γVarx(Xτ ).
We consider a positive state processX . In this case Assumption 2.4 is satisfied. Note that
g′(h(x)) = 1+2γx, g′(ψλ,C(x)) = 1+2γψλ,C(x), and Jλ,C(x) = φλ,C(x)+ψλ,C(x)+
γψ2λ,C(x). Therefore, simple calculations give
f(x)− φλ,C(x) + g
′(ψλ,C(x)) (h(x) − ψλ,C(x))
= −γx2 − φλ,C(x) + (1 + 2γψλ,C(x)) (x− ψλ,C(x))
= x− Jλ,C(x)− γ(ψλ,C(x)− x)
2.
It follows that conditions (III) and (IV) can be written as
Jλ,C(x) = x− γ(ψλ,C(x)− x)
2, for x ∈ C with λ(x) > 0,
Jλ,C(x) ≥ x− γ(ψλ,C(x)− x)
2, for x ∈ C with λ(x) = 0.
Using that f(x) + g(h(x)) = x we write condition (I) as,
Jλ,C(x) ≥ x, for x ∈ C. (4.10)
Let us again consider the geometric Brownian motion. In the typical case it is reasonable
to suppose that Jλ,C(x) − x > 0 for x ∈ C and in this case we note, using Lemma 5.2,
that if τη,D ∈ N with η = 0, then, for x ∈ C ∩D,
lim
hց0
Jτλ,C (x)− Jτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)
Ex(τh)
= λ(x){f(x) − φλ,C(x) + g
′(ψλ,C(x)) (h(x) − ψλ,C(x))}
= λ(x){x − Jλ,C(x)− γ(ψλ,C(x)− x)
2}
< 0. (4.11)
Consequently we make the ansatz λ(x) = 0 for x ∈ C . Specifically, we make the ansatz
that τC for C = (0, b) is an equilibrium stopping time for some b to be determined. We
start by noting that if τC satisfies (4.10) then condition (I) and condition (IV) are satisfied,
and condition (III) is irrelevant (since the ansatz is λ = 0 on C). Hence, if we can find a
setC = (0, b) such that (4.10), (II) and (V) are satisfied then τC is an equilibrium strategy.
Theorem 4.6. Let X be given by
dXt = µXtdt+ σXtdWt, where σ
2 > 0.
If µ ∈ (0, σ2/4], then τˆ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ b} with b =
ξ
γ(1−ξ) , where ξ :=
2µ
σ2
, is an
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equilibrium stopping time and the corresponding equilibrium value function is,
Jτˆ (x) =
{
x, x ≥ b,
x1−ξ(bξ − γb1+ξ) + γb2ξx2−2ξ, x < b.
If µ ∈ (σ2/4, σ2/2), then no equilibrium stopping time exists.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
0.2
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Figure 2 The equilibrium value function x 7→ Jτˆ (x) (solid) and x 7→ f(x) + g(x) = x (dashed)
in the GBM case with parameters µ = 0.07, σ2 = 0.45 and γ = 1.1 (in this case
b ≈ 0.4106).
Remark 4.7. If µ ≤ 0 then X is a supermartingale (with a last element) and it follows
directly from Jτ (x) = Ex(Xτ ) − γVarx(Xτ ), Definition 2.3 and the optional sampling
theorem that it is an equilibrium strategy to always stop immediately. If µ ≥ σ
2
2 then
τ b := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ b} < ∞ a.s. for any initial state x ≤ b for each b ∈ E and
Jτb(x) = Ex(Xτb) − γ
(
Ex(X
2
τb
)− E2x(Xτb)
)
= b − γ(b2 − b2) = b can thus become
arbitrarily large.
Remark 4.8. A mean-variance optimal stopping problem for a GBM is studied in [34].
There it is shown that the stopping time τˆ in Theorem 4.6 is dynamically optimal when
µ ∈ (0, σ2/2), see [34, Theorem 3]. It is also argued that this stopping time is a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium when µ ∈ (0, σ2/4], see [34, Sec. 4], which is in line with our
findings in Theorem 4.6.
Proof. We remark that it follows from the calculations below that τˆ is admissible. A stop-
ping time is, according to Theorem 3.2, an equilibrium stopping time if and only if con-
ditions (I)—(V) are satisfied. Note that we do not have to check (III) since τˆ has no Cox
process component, which corresponds to λ(x) = 0 for each x. Recall that if (4.10) is
satisfied then (I) and (IV) are also satisfied. Note that (II) can in this case be written as
AXf(x) + g
′(h(x))AXh(x) = x(−γσ
2x+ µ) ≤ 0, for x ∈ int(Cc). (4.12)
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It follows that if we can verify (4.10), (4.12) and (V) for τˆ then we are done. Let us now
consider the candidate equilibrium stopping time τ b := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ b} and use the
smooth fit condition to see that necessarily b = ξ
γ(1−ξ) . Recall, from standard theory, that
for any b,
Px(τ
b <∞) = bξ−1x1−ξ, for x ≤ b. (4.13)
Since Xt → 0 a.s. as t→∞, it hence holds, for any x ≤ b, that
ψτb(x) = Ex(Xτb)
= Ex(XτbI{τb<∞}) + Ex(XτbI{τb=∞})
= bξx1−ξ.
Similarly, Ex(X
2
τb
) = b1+ξx1−ξ. Hence, for x ≤ b,
Jτb(x) = Ex(Xτb)− γ
(
Ex(X
2
τ )− E
2
x(Xτ )
)
= x1−ξ(bξ − γb1+ξ) + γb2ξx2−2ξ .
It is easy to verify that Jτb(b) = b, for any b, and hence the function
Jτb(x) =
{
x, x ≥ b,
x1−ξ(bξ − γb1+ξ) + γb2ξx2−2ξ, x < b,
is continuous. Note that
J ′τb(x) =
{
1, x > b,
(1− ξ)x−ξ(bξ − γb1+ξ) + (2− 2ξ)γb2ξx1−2ξ, x < b,
where the lower part is, for x = b, equal to:
(1− ξ)b−ξ(bξ − γb1+ξ) + (2− 2ξ)γb2ξb1−2ξ = (1− ξ)(1− γb) + 2(1− ξ)γb
= (1− ξ)(1 + γb).
In order for the smooth fit condition (Theorem 3.5) to be satisfied we need that J ′
τb
(b) is
equal to f ′(x) + g′(h(x))h′(x) = 1. We thus need that (1− ξ)(1 + γb) = 1. Hence, the
only possible b is given by
b =
1
γ
(
1
(1− ξ)
− 1
)
=
ξ
γ(1− ξ)
.
It is easily verified that (4.12) holds when b = ξ
γ(1−ξ) , using that µ ∈ (0, σ
2/4] (i.e.
ξ ∈ (0, 1/2]). From the explicit form of Jτb(x) above it follows that (4.10) is satisfied
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exactly when
x1−ξ(bξ − γb1+ξ) + γb2ξx2−2ξ − x ≥ 0, for x < b. (4.14)
It is straightforward to show that this inequality is satisfied, using that ξ ∈ (0, 1/2] and
b = ξ
γ(1−ξ) , and thereby verifying (4.10). The only thing we have left is to verify (V),
which we will do using Theorem 3.6. From the calculations above follows that
φτb(x) = Ex(−γX
2
τb
) =
{
−γx2, x ≥ b,
−γb1+ξx1−ξ, x < b,
ψτb(x) = Ex(Xτb) =
{
x, x ≥ b,
bξx1−ξ, x < b.
Let us drop the subscript τ b. It follows that
φ′(x) =
{
−2γx, x > b,
−(1− ξ)γb1+ξx−ξ, x < b,
φ′′(x) =
{
−2γ, x > b,
ξ(1− ξ)γb1+ξx−ξ−1, x < b.
Thus,
AXφ(x) = µxφ
′(x) +
1
2
σ2x2φ′′(x)
=
{
−2µγx2 − 12σ
2x22γ, x > b,
−µx(1− ξ)γb1+ξx−ξ + 12σ
2x2ξ(1− ξ)γb1+ξx−ξ−1, x < b,
=
{
−2γx2(µ+ 12σ
2), x > b,
0, x < b,
where we in the last equality used that ξ = 2µ/σ2. Similarly,
ψ′(x) =
{
1, x > b,
(1− ξ)bξx−ξ, x < b,
ψ′′(x) =
{
0, x > b,
−ξ(1− ξ)bξx−ξ−1, x < b,
AXψ(x) =
{
µx, x > b,
0, x < b.
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Note that g′(ψ(b)) = 1 + 2γψ(b) = 1 + 2γb. Thus,
AXφ(x) + g
′(ψ(b))AXψ(x) =
{
x{µ+ 2γµ(b− x)− γσ2x}, x > b,
0, x < b.
(4.15)
It is easily checked that φ and ψ are a C2 everywhere except at x = b and that φ(·) +
g′(ψ(b))ψ(·) is C1 everywhere. Hence, we may use Theorem 3.6. Let us verify that (3.16)
holds:
Trivially, g′′(b) = 2γ. For the GBM it holds that σ2(x) = x2σ2. Moreover, ξ
2
2 σ
2 = ξµ,
γb = ξ1−ξ and −1 + σ
2ξ/µ = 1. Using these findings, including (4.15), we obtain
AXφ(b+) + g
′(ψ(b))AXψ(b+) +AXφ(b−) + g
′(ψ(b))AXψ(b−)
+ g′′(ψ(b))
(
ψ′(b+)− ψ′(b−)
2
)2
σ2(b)
= b
(
µ− γσ2b− γb
ξ2
2
σ2
)
= −bµ
(
ξ − 1 + σ2ξ/µ− ξ2
1− ξ
)
= −bµ
1 + ξ − ξ2
1− ξ
≤ 0,
where the inequality follows from ξ ∈ (0, 1/2]. This means that (3.16) holds, which,
by Theorem 3.6, implies that condition (V) holds and the first statement of the theorem
follows.
Let us consider µ ∈ (σ2/4, σ2/2). From (4.10) and the calculations in (4.11) follows that
an equilibrium must satisfy either λ(x) = 0 or ψλ,C(x) = x and Jλ,C(x) = x, for each
x ∈ C . But if ψλ,C(x) = Ex(Xτ ) = x and Jλ,C(x) = Ex(Xτ ) − γVarx(Xτ ) = x then
Varx(Xτ ) = 0. Now, the onlyway Varx(Xτ ) = 0 holds for x ∈ C is that τ is the threshold
time for some constant 0 < c < x, by basic properties of the GBM in the present case.
But this implies Jλ,C(x) = Ex(Xτ )− γVarx(Xτ ) = c < x which violates (4.10). Hence,
for equilibria it must hold for each x ∈ C that λ(x) = 0. To prove the second statement
of the theorem it is thus enough to prove that τC cannot be an equilibrium stopping time
for an arbitrary continuation set C . Since C is open, cf. Definition 2.2, follows that C
must be described by either of the cases below. We conclude the proof by showing that
none of these cases allow for equilibria.
Case 1: C = ∅. In this case there exists an x ∈ int(Cc) such that the inequality in (4.12)
does not hold, cf. µ, γ, σ2 > 0. Hence, C = ∅ is not an equilibrium.
Case 2: C = (0,∞). In this case JC(x) = 0 and hence (4.10) does not hold. Hence,
C = (0,∞) is not an equilibrium.
Case 3: (0, c) ⊂ C for some constant 0 < c <∞, c ∈ ∂C . This corresponds to the type of
stopping time investigated in the first part of this proof. Using the arguments before and
after (4.14) we find that for a stopping time of this type it is required that µ ∈ (0, σ2/4]
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in order for (4.10) to hold. Hence, no equilibrium exists for this case.
Case 4: (c, d) ⊂ C for some constants 0 < c < d <∞, c, d ∈ ∂C . Consider an x ∈ (c, d).
From basic properties of the GBM follows,
Px(τ
c,d = d) =
x1−ξ − c1−ξ
d1−ξ − c1−ξ
, x ∈ [c, d]. (4.16)
Simple calculations give,
φτc,d(x) = −γ Ex(X
2
τc,d
) =
{
−γ (d
2−c2)x1−ξ+d1−ξc2−c1−ξd2
d1−ξ−c1−ξ
, x ∈ (c, d)
−γx2, x ∈ {c, d},
ψτc,d(x) = Ex(Xτc,d) =
{
(d−c)x1−ξ+d1−ξc−c1−ξd
d1−ξ−c1−ξ
, x ∈ (c, d)
x, x ∈ {c, d}.
For x ∈ (c, d) we can thus determine constants ci, such that,
ψτc,d(x) = c1x
1−ξ + c2, φτc,d(x) = c3x
1−ξ + c4.
Using the same notation we find for the function M(x) := Jc,d(x) − x and x ∈ (c, d)
that,
M(x) = φτc,d(x) + ψτc,d(x) + γψ
2
τc,d(x)− x
= c5x
1−ξ + c6 + c7x
2−2ξ − x,
M ′(x) = c8x
−ξ + c9x
1−2ξ − 1,
M ′′(x) = x−2ξ(c10x
ξ−1 + c11).
Now suppose τ c,d is an equilibrium stopping time, then, by smooth fit,M ′(c) = M ′(d) =
0 (sufficient differentiability around the points c and d for the use of Theorem 3.5 is easily
seen to be fulfilled). Moreover, it is directly seen thatM ′′(x) has at most one zero in (c, d);
and that in order forM ′(c) = M ′(d) = 0 to be true it must indeed have a zero in (c, d).
From this follows thatM is strictly increasing or strictly decreasing on (c, d) and hence
thatM(c) andM(d) cannot both be equal to zero, which, by definition ofM , means that
τ c,d cannot be an equilibrium stopping time, and we have reached a contradiction. Hence,
no equilibrium exists for this case.
Case 5: (c,∞) ⊂ C for some constant 0 < c ∈ ∂C . In this case it is easy to see that either
Cc = (0, c] or C contains a bounded interval. For the first alternative follows directly
that (4.12) is violated. The second alternative is covered by Case 4. Hence, no equilibrium
exists for this case.
4.3 An example with two equilibria
Here we present an example with two different equilibrium value functions, implying
unique equilibria cannot generally be expected. Suppose X is a Wiener process. Let
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f(x) = x
6
9 −
x4
3 , g(x) = x
2 − 5x
3
9 and h(x) = x
2. Define the stopping time τˆ = 0,
which corresponds to C = ∅ and any intensity function λ. Condition (II) of Theorem
3.2 is then directly verified and the other conditions are in this case irrelevant. Hence,
τˆ = 0 is an equilibrium stopping time and the corresponding equilibriumvalue function is
Jˆ(x) = f(x)+g(h(x)). Now define τ˜ as the stopping time corresponding toC = (−1, 1)
and λ = 0. With obvious notation and basic properties of the Wiener process we find,
φ˜(x) =
−2
9
, ψ˜(x) = 1, J˜(x) =
2
9
, for x ∈ C. (4.17)
Using these observations and tedious calculations it can be verified that (I) and (IV) hold,
whereas (II) is verified as above and (III) is irrelevant. Condition (V) can be verified by
explicit calculation of a(x, h), for x = −1, 1; where the main observation is that e.g.
E1
(
φ˜(Xτh)
)
= 12
−2
9 +
1
2f(1 + h), which is seen using (4.17) and that X is a Wiener
process.
5 Appendix
Lemma 5.1. For any τλ,C ∈ N and x ∈ C ,
AXφλ,C(x) = lim
hց0
φτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x)− φλ,C(x)
Ex(τh)
= λ(x)(φλ,C(x)− f(x)). (5.1)
Proof. Using arguments similar to those we used to arrive at (3.1) and the strong Markov
property we obtain
φτλ,C⋄τλ,C(h)(x) = Ex
(
f
(
Xτλ,C⋄τλ,C(h)
))
= Ex
(
I{τλ≤τh}f (Xτλ,C ) + I{τλ>τh}f
(
Xτλ,C◦θτh+τh
))
= Ex (f(Xτλ,C ))
= φλ,C(x),
for 0 < h ≤ h¯, for some h¯ > 0. This implies that the second equality in (5.1) follows from
Lemma 3.1. Now use the strong Markov property to see that
φτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x) = Ex
(
f
(
Xτλ,C◦θτh+τh
))
= Ex
(
Ex
(
f
(
Xτλ,C◦θτh+τh
)
|Fτh
))
= Ex (φλ,C(Xτh)) .
Hence, the first equality in (5.1) follows from the definition of the characteristic operator
AX .
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Lemma 5.2. For any τλ,C , τη,D ∈ N and x ∈ C ∩D,
lim
hց0
Jλ,C(x)− Jτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)
Ex(τh)
= (λ(x)− η(x)){f(x) − φλ,C(x) + g
′(ψλ,C(x)) (h(x)− ψλ,C(x))}.
Proof. Use the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 5.1 to obtain
Jτλ,C (x)− Jτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)
= Jτλ,C⋄τλ,C(h)(x)− Jτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x)− (Jτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)− Jτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x)). (5.2)
The second part of (5.2) can, by definition, be written as
Jτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)− Jτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x)
= φτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)− φτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x) + g(ψτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x))− g(ψτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x)).
From Lemma 3.1 it follows that
lim
hց0
φτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)− φτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x)
Ex(τh)
= η(x)(f(x)− φλ,C(x)).
Use the same arguments as for (3.2) to obtain (here ηt := η(Xt))
ψτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)
= ψτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x) + Ex
(∫ τh
0
ηte
−
∫ t
0
ηsds (h(Xt)− ψλ,C (Xτh)) dt
)
.
Using standard Taylor expansion we thus obtain
g(ψτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)) − g(ψτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x))
= g
(
ψτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x) + Ex
(∫ τh
0
ηte
−
∫ t
0
ηsds (h(Xt)− ψλ,C (Xτh)) dt
))
− g(ψτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x))
= g′
(
ψλ,C◦θτh+τh(x)
)
Ex
(∫ τh
0
ηte
−
∫ t
0
ηsds (h(Xt)− ψλ,C (Xτh)) dt
)
+ o(Ex(τh)).
Use the equality above and ψτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x) = Ex (ψλ,C(Xτh)) to obtain
lim
hց0
g(ψτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x))− g(ψτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x))
Ex(τh)
= g′(ψλ,C(x))η(x)(h(x) − ψτλ,C (x)).
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Putting the above together gives us that the limit for the second part of (5.2) satisfies
lim
hց0
Jτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)− Jτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x)
Ex(τh)
= η(x){f(x) − φλ,C(x) + g
′(ψλ,C(x)) (h(x)− ψλ,C(x))}. (5.3)
In the same way we obtain that the limit for the first part of (5.2) satisfies
lim
hց0
Jτλ,C⋄τλ,C(h)(x)− Jτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x)
Ex(τh)
= λ(x){f(x)− φλ,C(x) + g
′(ψλ,C(x)) (h(x) − ψλ,C(x))}. (5.4)
The result follows from (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4).
Lemma 5.3. For any τλ,C , τη,D ∈ N and x ∈ int(Cc) ∩D,
lim
hց0
Jλ,C(x)− Jτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)
Ex(τh)
= −AXf(x)− g
′(h(x))AXh(x).
Proof. Since D and int(Cc) are open it follows that there exists a constant h¯ > 0 such
that, for 0 < h ≤ h¯,
τλ,C ⋄ τη,D(h) = I{τη,D≤τh}τ
η,D + I{τη,D>τh}(τ
λ,C ◦ θτh + τh)
= I{τη≤τh}τ
η + I{τη>τh}(τ
λ,C ◦ θτh + τh)
= τη ∧ τh.
Since x ∈ int(Cc) ∩D it follows that
Jτλ,C (x)− Jτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)
= f(x)− φτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x) + g(h(x)) − g(ψτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)). (5.5)
Use Itô’s formula to rewrite the first part of (5.5) as
f(x)− φτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x) = f(x)− Ex
(
f
(
Xτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)
))
= −Ex
(∫ τη∧τh
0
AXf(Xt)dt
)
.
It follows that
lim
hց0
f(x)− φτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)
Ex(τh)
= −AXf(x).
Use similar arguments and standard Taylor expansion to rewrite the second part of (5.5)
g(h(x)) − g(ψτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)) = −g
′(h(x))Ex
(∫ τη∧τh
0
AXh(Xt)dt
)
+ o(Ex(τh)).
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Thus,
lim
hց0
g(h(x)) − g(ψτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x))
Ex(τh)
= −g′(h(x))AXh(x).
The result follows.
Lemma 5.4. For any τλ,C , τη,D ∈ N and x ∈ ∂C ∩D,
lim inf
hց0
Jλ,C(x)− Jτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)
Ex(τh)
= lim inf
hց0
φλ,C(x)− Ex (φλ,C(Xτh)) + g(ψλ,C(x))− g (Ex (ψλ,C(Xτh)))
Ex(τh)
.
Proof. Here we use the temporary notation (A), (B) etc defined below. Write
Jλ,C(x)− Jτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)
= Jλ,C(x)− Jτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x)− (Jτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)− Jτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x))
= (A)− (B).
Write,
(B) := Jτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)− Jτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x)
= φτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)− φτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x) + g(ψτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)) − g(ψτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x))
= (B1) + (B2).
Use that x ∈ D and the same arguments as for (3.2) to see that there exists a constant
h¯ > 0 such that, for each 0 < h ≤ h¯,
(B1) := φτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x)− φτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x)
= Ex
(∫ τh
0
η(Xt)e
−
∫ t
0
η(Xs)ds (f(Xt)− φλ,C (Xτh)) dt
)
.
Similarly, using Taylor expansion, we obtain
(B2) := g(ψτλ,C⋄τη,D(h)(x))− g(ψτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x))
= g
(
ψτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x) + Ex
(∫ τh
0
η(Xt)e
−
∫ t
0
η(Xs)ds (h(Xt)− ψλ,C (Xτh)) dt
))
− g
(
ψτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x)
)
= g′(ψτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x))Ex
(∫ τh
0
η(Xt)e
−
∫ t
0
η(Xs)ds (h(Xt)− ψλ,C (Xτh)) dt
)
+ o(Ex(τh))
= g′(Ex (ψλ,C(Xτh)))Ex
(∫ τh
0
η(Xt)e
−
∫ t
0
η(Xs)ds (h(Xt)− ψλ,C (Xτh)) dt
)
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+ o(Ex(τh)).
Since φλ,C(x) − f(x) = 0 and ψλ,C(x) − h(x) = 0 for x ∈ ∂C , and these functions are
continuous (cf. admissibility), it follows that
lim inf
hց0
−(B)
Ex(τh)
= lim inf
hց0
−(B1)− (B2)
Ex(τh)
= 0.
Write
(A) : = Jλ,C(x)− Jτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x)
= φλ,C(x) + g(ψλ,C(x)) −
(
φτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x) + g(ψτλ,C◦θτh+τh
(x))
)
= φλ,C(x) + g(ψλ,C(x)) − (Ex (φλ,C(Xτh)) + g(Ex (ψλ,C(Xτh)))) .
The result follows.
Proof. (of Theorem 3.2). In this proof we use the notation τˆ = τλ,C . Let us first suppose
that τˆ is an equilibrium stopping time, i.e. that it satisfies (2.2) for each x ∈ E and each
τη,D ∈ N , and show that this implies that conditions (I)–(V) are satisfied. Let us consider
different cases for x.
• x ∈ C : Set D = C and use Lemma 5.2 to see that (2.2) can in this case be written
as
(λ(x) − η(x)){f(x) − φλ,C(x) + g
′(ψλ,C(x)) (h(x)− ψλ,C(x))} ≥ 0.
It follows that conditions (III) and (IV) are satisfied. To see this recall that the non-
negative function η can be chosen so that η(x) is arbitrarily large or η(x) = 0.
Now set D = ∅, which implies that the numerator of the left side of (2.2) is
Jλ,C(x) − f(x) − g(h(x)), which does not depend on the constant h. This im-
plies that (I) holds.
• x ∈ int(Cc): Set D = int(Cc) and use Lemma 5.3 to see that (2.2) can in this case
be written as −AXf(x) − g
′(h(x))AXh(x) ≥ 0. It follows that condition (II) is
satisfied.
• x ∈ ∂C : Set D = E and use Lemma 5.4 to see that the left side of (2.2) is equal to
the left side of the inequality in (V), which directly implies that condition (V) holds.
Le us now suppose that τˆ solves the system (I)–(V) and show that this implies that τˆ is an
equilibrium stopping time, i.e. that it satisfies (2.2) for each x ∈ E and each τη,D ∈ N .
Let us consider an arbitrary τη,D ∈ N and different cases for x.
• x ∈ D:
– If x ∈ C and λ(x) > 0, then the left side of (2.2) is, by Lemma 5.2, equal to
(λ(x) − η(x)){f(x) − φλ,C(x) + g
′(ψλ,C(x)) (h(x)− ψλ,C(x))} and hence
(III) implies that (2.2) must hold.
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– If x ∈ C and λ(x) = 0, then the left side of (2.2) is, by Lemma 5.2, equal
to −η(x){f(x) − φλ,C(x) + g
′(ψλ,C(x)) (h(x)− ψλ,C(x))} and hence (IV)
implies that (2.2) must hold.
– If x ∈ int(Cc), then Lemma 5.3 implies that the left side of (2.2) is equal to
−AXf(x)− g
′(h(x))AXh(x) and hence (II) implies that (2.2) must hold.
– If x ∈ ∂C , then Lemma 5.4 and (V) implies that (2.2) must hold.
• x ∈ Dc: The numerator of the left side of (2.2) is in this case Jλ,C(x) − f(x) −
g(h(x)) and hence (I) implies that (2.2) holds for x ∈ C . In case x /∈ C then the
numerator is zero.
Lemma 5.5. For any x ∈ E holds,
lim
hց0
h2
Ex(τh)
= σ2(x) and lim
hց0
Ex(τ
2
h)
Ex(τh)
= 0.
Proof. Consider a fixed x ∈ E, a constant a > 0 and let F (t, y) := a(y − x)2 − t. Using
simple calculations we find that there exists a constant h¯ such that for y ∈ (x− h¯, x+ h¯)
holds
(
∂
∂t
+AX
)
F (t, y) = −1 + aσ2(y) + µ(y)2a(y − x) ≥ 0 whenever aσ2(x) > 1;
which with Itô’s formula and the optional sampling theorem gives Ex(F (τh,Xτh)) =
ah2 − Ex(τh) ≥ 0 for h < h¯. Hence, lim infhց0
h2
Ex(τh)
≥ 1
a
. With the same arguments
we find that lim suphց0
h2
Ex(τh)
≤ 1
b
for bσ2(x) < 1 and the first claim of the lemma
follows directly.
Now let F (t, y) := at(y − x)2 − t2. Then there exists a constant h¯ such that for y ∈
(x − h¯, x + h¯) holds
(
∂
∂t
+AX
)
F (t, y) = a(y − x)2 + t(a(2µ(y)(y − x) + σ2(y)) −
2) > 0, for aσ2(x) > 2. Using the same arguments as above we can now show that
Ex(aτhh
2 − τ2h) ≥ 0 for h < h¯. The second claim follows.
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